Depleted uranium from Gulf War 2 "Shock and Awe" bombing in 2003 spread across Europe and reached Britain within 9 days.
European Biology and Bioelectromagnetics (EBAB) has published a paper: Did the use of Uranium weapons in Gulf War 2 result in contamination of Europe? Evidence from the measurements of the Atomic
Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston, Berkshire,
UK. Chris Busby, Saoirse Morgan. Occasional Paper 2006/1, January 2006
Aberystwyth: Green Audit
Uranium weapons have been increasingly employed in battle action since their first use
by the US and UK forces in the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Since then they have been
used in the Balkans in the late 1990s, then Kosovo in 2000, probably in Afghanistan in
2002 and then also in the 2nd Gulf War (GW2) in March and April 2003. On impact,
uranium penetrators burn fiercely to give an aerosol of sub micron diameter oxide
particles which are largely insoluble and remain in the environment for many years.
There is considerable public and scientific concern that these radioactive particles may
remain suspended for long periods, or may become resuspended and are therefore
available for inhalation by non combatants at some distance from the point of impact.
Little research seems to have been carried out on the distance travelled by the uranium
aerosols. The military maintain that the uranium remains near the point of impact, and the
Royal Society report (2002) also states that the material does not travel more than some
tens of metres. On the other hand, measurements of uranium in local populations in
Kosovo some nine months after the use of uranium weapons all tested positive for
depleted uranium in urine (Priest 2004) and The United Nations (UNEP) found uranium
particles in air filters in Bosnia some years after its use. The question of the dispersion of
uranium aerosols from the battlefield is of significant legal interest, since if a radioactive
weapon resulted in the general contamination of the public in the country of deployment
or elsewhere, the weapon would be classifiable as one of indiscriminate effect.
There is now conceded to be no safe level of exposure to radiation. Further, there
are major scientific questions over the risk models used to assess the health effects of
uranium particle exposure from weapons use. In addition there is evidence of ill health in
many of those exposed to uranium particles from Gulf veterans to the population of Iraq.
In this paper we examine the trend in uranium shown by the measurements made on high
volume air sampler filter systems deployed by the Atomic Weapons Establishment
(AWE) Aldermaston Berkshire UK. AWE have been routinely monitoring uranium in air
since the early 1990s but since 2000 have carried out filter determinations from high
volume air samplers (HVAS) every two weeks. They were required to set up these
monitors in the late 1980s following the discovery of a child leukaemia cluster near the
plant. There are monitors onsite but they also deploy them at various other sites some
15km distance from the plant. We have obtained their results using the Freedom of
Information Act. Examination of the trends in uranium reported here show that there was
a statistically significant increase in uranium in all the filters beginning at the start of
GW2 and ending when it ended. Levels in the town of Reading exceeded the
Environment Agency Reporting threshold of 1000nBq/m3 twice during the period. We
report the weather conditions at the time and show that over the period there was a
consistent flow of air from Iraq northwards and that the UK was in the centre of a
anticyclone which drew air in from the south and from the south east. On the basis of the
mean increase in uranium in air of about 500nBq/m3 we use respiration data on standard
man to calculate that each person in the area inhaled some 23 million uranium particles of
diameter 0.25 microns. We suggest that health data, particularly birth data be examined
for possible effects from this exposure. As far as we know, this is the first evidence that
uranium aerosols from battle use have been shown to travel so far.
Click here for
Sunday Times report of 19th February 2006
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Critics rebutted - see this link
EBAB is a pay-to-view journal, but someone has published the paper with open access.
Click here
Abstract
Keywords: uranium, depleted uranium, particles, Gulf War 2, geophysical, dispersion,
Aldermaston
Dan Fahey attacked Green Audit's report. We reply.
[There's a link to the Fahey crit on the next page.]
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